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JUSTICE KITTREDGE:  We issued writ of certiorari to review the court of 
appeals decision affirming summary judgment in favor of Respondents Janette 
Buchanan and Shana Smallwood.  Buchanan v. S.C. Prop. & Cas. Ins. Guar. Ass'n, 
417 S.C. 562, 790 S.E.2d 783 (Ct. App. 2016).  On certiorari, the South Carolina 
Property and Casualty Insurance Guaranty Association (the Guaranty) argues the 
court of appeals erred in construing the provisions of the South Carolina Property 
and Casualty Insurance Guaranty Association Act (the Act)1 and affirming the trial 
court's finding that the Guaranty's statutory offset of $376,622 should be deducted 
from the claimant's total amount of stipulated damages of $800,000 rather than the 
Association's mandatory statutory claim limit of $300,000.  We conclude the Act is 
ambiguous, and we further find the court of appeals correctly construed the Act to 
require that settlement amounts be offset from the total amount of an injured 
party's damages rather than from the $300,000 statutory cap.  We therefore affirm 
the court of appeals' decision as modified.  
I. 
The underlying dispute arose following a deadly motor vehicle accident in 
Bamberg County on January 7, 2008.  At the time of the accident, decedent James 
Buchanan was driving a tractor trailer traveling northbound on U.S. Highway 321.  
Heading southbound on U.S. Highway 321 were three vehicles—a logging truck 
followed by two tractor trailers, one driven by Willie Pelote and the other by his 
brother Roger Pelote, both of whom are former parties to this action.  As the 
vehicles converged, a set of tandem tires came loose from the logging truck and 
struck Mr. Buchanan's vehicle, breaking the front axle.  As a result, Mr. 
Buchanan's truck crossed the center line and struck the second tractor trailer.  Mr. 
Buchanan's tractor trailer caught fire, and he died at the scene.   
Thereafter, Respondents, as co-personal representatives of Mr. Buchanan's estate, 
filed a wrongful death claim against the driver of the logging truck; the owner of 
the logging truck; Strobel Tire Co., which performed tire maintenance work on the 
logging truck shortly before the accident; and the Pelotes.2 
1 S.C. Code Ann. §§ 38-31-10 to -170 (2015 & Supp. 2017). 














                                        
 
The logging truck was insured by a policy with a limit of $1,000,000 issued by 
Aequicap Insurance Co. (Aequicap), which became insolvent during the pendency 
of the wrongful death action.  As a result of Aequicap's insolvency, Respondents 
asserted their claims against the Guaranty.   
Created by the Act, the Guaranty is a nonprofit, unincorporated association, of 
which all property and casualty insurers conducting business in South Carolina are 
members.  S.C. Code Ann. § 38-31-40 (2015).  The Guaranty's "purpose is to 
provide some protection to insureds whose insurance companies become 
insolvent." S.C. Prop. & Cas. Ins. Guar. Ass'n v. Carolinas Roofing & Sheet Metal 
Contractors Self-Ins. Fund, 315 S.C. 555, 557, 446 S.E.2d 422, 424 (1994). 
When an insurer becomes insolvent, the Guaranty steps into the shoes of the 
insurer "to the extent of its obligation on the covered claims."  S.C. Code Ann. 
§ 38-31-60(b); see Hudson ex rel. Hudson v. Lancaster Convalescent Ctr., 407 
S.C. 112, 124, 754 S.E.2d 486, 492 (2014) ("When [the] Guaranty steps into the 
shoes of an insolvent insurer, its liability is derivative of the insolvent insurance 
company's direct liability to the consumer.").  But by virtue of the Act, the 
Guaranty's obligation to pay is limited to $300,000 per claim.3 Id. § 38-31-
60(a)(iv). 
Ultimately, the parties settled the wrongful death claim, stipulating the amount of 
damages to be $800,000.  Thus far, Respondents have recovered a total of 
$376,622 from parties other than the Guaranty—$225,000 from the Pelotes' 
insurance carrier; $20,000 from Strobel Tire Co.; and $131,622 in workers' 
compensation death and funeral expenses.   
The parties agree $376,622 is the set-off amount.  The only disputed issue is what 
amount, if any, of the remaining $423,378 is within the Guaranty's statutory cap 
after setoff. Specifically, the question is whether the settlement amount is offset 
dismissed with prejudice in accordance with the parties' settlement agreement and 
is not at issue in this appeal.
3 Further, the Guaranty's obligation to pay ceases when $10 million has been paid 

















from the $800,000 of total damages or from the $300,000 statutory maximum 
obligation. 
Respondents filed a declaratory judgment action seeking an order that the Guaranty 
is obligated to pay the full $300,000 amount of the statutory cap.  The parties filed 
cross motions for summary judgment.  Respondents argued that the $376,622 is 
offset from the $800,000 total, leaving $423,378 in unpaid damages, of which the 
Guaranty is responsible for only $300,000—the statutory cap.  In contrast, the 
Guaranty argued the statutory cap is first applied to the overall claim, reducing it 
from $800,000 to $300,000; then, the $376,622 in settlements are offset, leaving 
the Guaranty liable for nothing. 
Following a hearing, the trial court entered summary judgment in favor of 
Respondents, and ordered the Guaranty to pay $300,000.  The court of appeals 
affirmed, concluding the Act was unambiguous and that its plain language required 
any recovery from solvent insurers to be deducted from the total amount of the 
damages rather than from the Guaranty's $300,000 cap.  Buchanan, 417 S.C. at 
569, 790 S.E.2d at 786. This Court issued a writ of certiorari to review the court of 
appeals' decision. 
II. 
The Guaranty argues the court of appeals correctly found the Act was 
unambiguous but erred in construing its provisions, which the Guaranty claims
entitle it to deduct the $376,622 offset from its $300,000 statutory maximum claim 
obligation, thus eliminating the Guaranty's liability altogether.  We disagree. 
Although we find the court of appeals erred in concluding the relevant statutory 
provisions are unambiguous, we nevertheless affirm the court of appeals' ultimate
construction of the Act. 
"Questions of statutory interpretation are questions of law, which we are free to 
decide without any deference to the court below."  S.C. Prop. & Cas. Ins. Guar. 
Ass'n v. Brock, 410 S.C. 361, 365, 764 S.E.2d 920, 922 (2014) (quotation marks 
and citation omitted).  "Because [the] Guaranty is a creature of statute, its duties, 
liabilities, and obligations are controlled by the terms and conditions set forth in 













                                        
   
 
The Act defines a covered claim as "an unpaid claim . . . which arises out of and is 
within the coverage and is subject to the applicable limits of an insurance policy to 
which this chapter applies." S.C. Code Ann. § 38-31-20(8) (2015).4  The Guaranty 
"is obligated to the extent of claims existing before the determination of 
insolvency." Id. § 38-31-60(a).  "This obligation includes only the amount each 
covered claim is in excess of two hundred fifty dollars and is less than three 
hundred thousand dollars."  Id. § 38-31-60(a)(iv). Before seeking payment from
the Guaranty, a claimant is required to exhaust "all coverage and limits" available 
through any other applicable policy. Id. § 38-31-100(1) (2015). 
Regarding setoff, the Act provides in relevant part: 
(1) A person, having a claim under an insurance policy, whether or 
not it is a policy issued by a member insurer, and the claim under 
such other policy arises from the same facts, injury, or loss that 
gave rise to the covered claim against the association, is required 
to first exhaust all coverage and limits provided by any such 
policy. Any amount payable on a covered claim under this 
chapter must be reduced by the full limits of such other coverage 
as set forth on the declarations page and the association shall
receive a full credit for such limits, or, where there are no 
applicable limits, the claim must be reduced by the total recovery. 
Notwithstanding the foregoing, no person may be required to 
exhaust all coverage and limits under the policy of an insolvent 
insurer.
(a) A claim under a policy providing liability coverage to a person 
who may be jointly and severally liable with or a joint 
tortfeasor with the person covered under the policy of the 
insolvent insurer that gives rise to the covered claim must be 
considered to be a claim arising from the same facts, injury, or 
loss that gave rise to the covered claim against the association.  
Any amount payable on a covered claim under this chapter 
4 It is undisputed Respondents' claim is a covered claim.
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must be reduced by the full and combined policy limits of all 
joint tortfeasers. 
 
(b) To the extent that the association's obligation is reduced by the 
application of this section, the liability of the person insured by 
the insolvent insurer's policy for the claim must be reduced in 
the same amount. 
  
Id. § 38-31-100(1) (emphasis added).5    
 
The key phrase "amount payable on a covered claim" is not defined in the Act.  In 
construing its meaning, "[t]he question of Legislative intent is, of course, the 
pivotal question with which we are here concerned."  Crescent Mfg. Co. v. Tax 
Comm'n, 129 S.C. 480, 485–86, 124 S.E. 761, 763 (1924) (noting "the essential 
nature and raison d'être of [the subject matter] are properly borne in mind" in 
approaching the construction of an act). 
 
The Guaranty contends the court of appeals' interpretation of the phrase "amount 
payable on a covered claim" to be the full amount of the covered claim (i.e. total 
damages) renders the words "amount payable" meaningless and reads that phrase 
out of the statute. The Guaranty argues that key phrase is given effect only when 
the setoff provision in section 38-31-100 is applied to the $300,000 statutory cap 
rather than the full amount of the claim.  In support of its argument, the Guaranty 
cites CFRE, LLC v. Greenville Cty. Assessor, 395 S.C. 67, 74, 716 S.E.2d 877, 881 
(2011) ("In that vein, we must read the statute so that no word, clause, sentence, 
provision or part shall be rendered surplusage, or superfluous, for the General 
Assembly obviously intended the statute to have some efficacy, or the legislature 
would not have enacted it into law." (internal marks and citations omitted)).   
 
We acknowledge the argument that the phrase "amount payable" must mean 
something. Indeed, "[t]he various provisions of an act should be read so that all 
may, if possible, have their due and conjoint effect without repugnancy or 
inconsistency."  Crescent Mfg. Co., 129 S.C. at 492, 124 S.E.2d at 765.  However, 
 
                                        
5 Although the Act provides setoff is in the amount of the full policy limits of other 
available coverage, the parties stipulated in the settlement agreement that the setoff 















"[t]he court may not, in order to give effect to particular words, virtually destroy 
the meaning of the entire context; that is, give the particular words a significance 
which would be clearly repugnant to the statute, looked at as a whole, and 
destructive of its obvious intent."  Id.  In reading the provisions of the Act as a 
whole and bearing in mind its underlying purpose, we conclude the better-reasoned 
interpretation is that the "amount payable on a covered claim" refers to the 
claimant's overall damages—not the Guaranty's obligation on a covered claim.  
Moreover, we find the unmistakable purpose of the Act to hew more closely with 
the result we reach today.  Of course we acknowledge the purpose of the Guaranty 
is to provide some relief—not necessarily to make an injured claimant whole in 
every case, hence the limitation on liability.  Brock, 410 S.C. at 367–68, 764 
S.E.2d at 922. Nevertheless, we cannot conclude the General Assembly 
envisioned the setoff provision of section 38-31-100 to completely eliminate a 
severely injured claimant's ability to recover anything from the Guaranty simply by 
virtue of the fact that his injuries, and thus his partial recovery from other 
tortfeasors, was greater than $300,000.  We decline the invitation to construe the 
Act in a manner that would be "destructive of its obvious intent." Crescent Mfg. 
Co., 129 S.C. at 492, 124 S.E. at 765 (1924).    
We acknowledge there is a split of authority from other jurisdictions with similar 
statutory provisions. 6  However, our analysis is based upon the language and 
6 Compare Arizona Prop. & Cas. Ins. Guar. Fund v. Herder, 751 P.2d 519, 523 
(Ariz. 1988) (noting the phrase "amount payable on a covered claim" was "neither 
a model of clarity nor an exemplar of the draftsman's craft" and concluding that 
phrase "means simply that the total amount payable as damages for the claimant's 
injuries caused by the covered occurrence shall be reduced by the amount the 
claimant has recovered"), and Connecticut Ins. Guar. Ass'n v. Union Carbide 
Corp., 585 A.2d 1216, 1224–25 (Conn. 1991) (construing a similar statutory 
provision and concluding "[t]he evident purpose of providing in [the statutory 
section] . . . for a reduction of a covered claim 'by the amount of any recovery'
from other available insurance was to prevent a person from twice receiving 
benefits for the same loss or otherwise obtaining a windfall, not to reduce the 
amount of a claim for a loss that remains partially unsatisfied"), with Blackwell v. 
Pennsylvania Ins. Guar. Ass'n, 567 A.2d 1103, 1105 (Pa. 1989) (finding the phrase 
"any amount payable on a covered claim under this act" referred to the $299,900 











                                        
 
 
underlying purpose of the South Carolina Act, and we find the lower courts'
construction—namely, that any settlement amount is offset from the total claimed 
damages rather than the $300,000 statutory cap—is most consistent with the 
language and purpose of the Act.7 
III. 
Based on the foregoing, we find the statutory language is ambiguous.  We 
nevertheless conclude the court of appeals correctly construed the phrase "amount 
payable on a covered claim" as the total amount of damages suffered under a 
covered claim, not the Guaranty's statutory maximum claim obligation.  We 
therefore affirm the court of appeals' decision as modified. 
BEATTY, C.J., HEARN and JAMES, JJ., concur.  FEW, J., concurring in a 
separate opinion in which KITTREDGE and JAMES, JJ., concur.  
7 Our holding today is also consistent with our appellate courts' interpretation of 
the Tort Claims Act which, unlike the Guaranty Act, includes an express statement 
of legislative intent to limit/reduce the government's liability.  See S.C. Code Ann. 
§ 15-78-200 (directing that the provisions of the Tort Claims Act "must be liberally 
construed in favor of limiting the liability of the governmental entity"); Smalls v. 
S.C. Dep't of Educ., 339 S.C. 208, 222, 528 S.E.2d 682, 689 (Ct. App. 2000) 
("[W]e find the jury verdict should be reduced by the amount of the settlement 
allocated to each cause of action and then further reduced by the comparative 
negligence of [the decedent].  Finally, the $250,000 cap under the Tort Claims Act 








JUSTICE FEW: I concur fully in Justice Kittredge's majority opinion.  I 
write separately to address a principle of law erroneously employed by the 
court of appeals as a principle of statutory interpretation. 
In Antley v. New York Life Insurance Co., 139 S.C. 23, 137 S.E. 199 (1927), 
this Court faced the question of whether an insured may assign the proceeds 
of a life insurance policy without the consent of the beneficiary.  139 S.C. at 
27, 137 S.E. at 200-01. The Court acknowledged that in prior decisions it 
had given conflicting answers to the question of whether a beneficiary's 
interest is vested. 139 S.C. at 28-29, 137 S.E. at 201; compare, e.g., Taff v. 
Smith, 114 S.C. 306, 311, 103 S.E. 551, 553 (1920) (holding the beneficiary 
holds a vested interest in a life insurance policy); with Bost v. Volunteer State 
Life Ins. Co., 114 S.C. 405, 409, 103 S.E. 771, 772 (1920) (holding "the 
beneficiary does not take a vested interest" in a life insurance policy).  
Explaining the authority of the Court to resolve the conflict between our prior 
decisions, we stated, 
In this state of conflict between the decisions, it is up 
to the court to "choose ye this day whom he will 
serve"; and, in the duty of this decision, this court has 
the right to determine which doctrine best appeals to 
its sense of law, justice, and right. 
Antley, 139 S.C. at 30, 137 S.E. at 201 (quoting Joshua 24:15 (King James)).
In choosing between its own conflicting decisions, it is—of course— 
appropriate for this Court to turn to "its sense of . . . justice[] and right."  We 
have applied this principle of law—also appropriately—in other contexts.  In 
Huggins v. Commercial & Savings Bank, 141 S.C. 480, 140 S.E. 177 (1927), 
for example, we addressed a novel question of law not controlled by statute 
nor governed by any of our prior decisions.  We stated, 
In the absence of legislative enactment to direct us, 
with no precedent to bind us, and without decision to 
guide us, it seems necessary for this court to decide at 







decision, the striking language of Mr. Justice Cothran 
in a recent case, where the situation was somewhat 
like the present, seems appropriate: 
In this state of conflict between the 
decisions, it is up to the court to "choose 
ye this day whom ye will serve"; and, in 
the duty of this decision, this court has 
the right to determine which doctrine best 
appeals to its sense of law, justice, and 
right.
141 S.C. at 495, 140 S.E. at 182 (quoting Antley, 139 S.C. at 30, 137 S.E. at 
201). 
We have also used this principle of law appropriately on numerous occasions 
when deciding certified questions from other courts involving novel 
questions of law not controlled by statute or prior decision.  In Donze v. 
General Motors, LLC, 420 S.C. 8, 800 S.E.2d 479 (2017), for example, we 
answered certified questions concerning our comparative negligence laws 
and public policy, neither of which was controlled by statute or prior 
decision. We stated, 
When a certified question raises a novel question of 
law, this Court is free to answer the question "based 
on its assessment of which answer and reasoning 
would best comport with the law and public policies 
of the state as well as the Court's sense of law, 
justice, and right." 
420 S.C. at 11, 800 S.E.2d at 480 (quoting Drury Dev. Corp. v. Found. Ins. 
Co., 380 S.C. 97, 101, 668 S.E.2d 798, 800 (2008)).  
Unfortunately, however, this Court has inappropriately recited this principle 
of law in cases that did involve statutory interpretation.  See, e.g., Lambries v.
Saluda Cty. Council, 409 S.C. 1, 5, 8, 760 S.E.2d 785, 787, 788 (2014) 






Carolina Code (Supp. 2017)); Sloan v. S.C. Bd. of Physical Therapy Exam'rs, 
370 S.C. 452, 466-67, 636 S.E.2d 598, 605-06 (2006) (interpreting as "a 
novel question of law" subsection 40-45-110(A)(1) of the South Carolina 
Code (2011)), overruled on other grounds by Joseph v. S.C. Dep't of Labor, 
Licensing & Regulation, 417 S.C. 436, 790 S.E.2d 763 (2016); Miller v. 
Aiken, 364 S.C. 303, 306, 613 S.E.2d 364, 365 (2005) (interpreting as "a 
novel question of law" section 38-77-160 of the South Carolina Code 
(2015)). 
If it were true courts have the authority to interpret statutes according to a 
sense of justice and right, then courts would have the power to rewrite 
statutes to suit their own personal preferences, regardless of legislative intent.  
Courts do not have that power. Rather, as Justice Kittredge explained in the 
majority opinion, courts must employ recognized principles of statutory 
interpretation with the purpose of discerning legislative intent.  There is no 
principle of statutory interpretation that allows a court to simply do what it 
thinks is just and right. While I agree with the majority that the court of 
appeals reached the correct result, the court of appeals erred by stating an 
"appellate court is free to decide" a question of statutory interpretation "based 
on its assessment of which interpretation and reasoning would best comport 
with . . . the Court's sense of law, justice, and right."  Buchanan v. The S.C. 
Prop. & Cas. Ins. Guar. Ass'n, 417 S.C. 562, 567, 790 S.E.2d 783, 785 (Ct. 
App. 2016). This principle of law first articulated in Antley is applicable only 
when our prior decisions are in conflict or when the Court is faced with novel 
questions of law not governed by statute or controlled by prior decision.  The 
principle is not applicable to the issue in this case. 
KITTREDGE and JAMES, JJ., concur.  
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James Edward Bradley and S. Jahue Moore, both of 
Moore Taylor Law Firm, PA, of West Columbia, for 
Petitioners. 
William W. Wilkins and Burl F. Williams, both of 
Nexsen Pruet, LLC, of Greenville, James Lynn Werner 
and Lawrence M. Hershon, both of Parker Poe Adams & 
Bernstein, LLP, and Poe D. Johnson, of Johnson & 
Barnett LLP, all of Columbia, for Respondents. 
JUSTICE KITTREDGE:  This case involves the South Carolina Home Builders 
Self Insurers Fund (Fund), which was created by the Home Builders Association of 
South Carolina, Inc. "for the purpose of meeting and fulfilling an employer's 
obligations and liabilities under the South Carolina Workers' Compensation Act."  
The Fund at issue here was established in September 1995 by an "Agreement and 
Declaration of Trust" (Agreement) between the Home Builders Association of 
South Carolina, Inc. (Association) and the Fund's Board of Trustees (Board).  The 
underlying dispute arose after the Board announced plans to wind down the Fund 
and use the Fund's remaining assets to finance a new mutual insurance company.  
Petitioners, who were members of the Fund, disagreed with that decision and 
challenged the Board's authority to use the Fund's assets in such a way.  The trial 
court twice dismissed Petitioners' suit, first on the basis that it involved the internal 
affairs of a trust and therefore should have been filed in probate court, then in a 
subsequent proceeding, on the basis that the lawsuit was a shareholder derivative 
action and that the complaint failed to comply with the pleading requirements of 
Rule 23(b)(1), SCRCP. 
On appeal, the court of appeals affirmed the dismissal of Petitioners' complaint, 
finding the trial court properly concluded (1) the Fund was not a trust; (2) 
Petitioners' claims were derivative in nature; and (3) that Petitioners' complaint 
was properly dismissed as it did not properly allege a pre-suit demand as required 
by Rule 23(b)(1). Patterson v. Witter, 418 S.C. 66, 791 S.E.2d 294 (Ct. App. 
2016). We issued a writ of certiorari to review the court of appeals' decision.  We 
reverse and remand, for Petitioners have satisfied the pleading requirements of 














                                        
I. 
All employers conducting business in South Carolina must secure the payment of 
compensation to their injured employees.  S.C. Code Ann. § 42-5-10 (2015).  This 
may be accomplished either by purchasing workers' compensation liability 
insurance or by qualifying as a "self-insured" employer.  To become self-insured, 
an employer must demonstrate to the Workers' Compensation Commission 
(Commission) that it has the "financial ability to pay directly the compensation in 
the amount and manner and when due as provided" by the Act.  S.C. Code Ann. 
§ 42-5-20 (2015). 
The Act also allows employers to create a self-insured workers' compensation 
liability fund or "pool." Id. § 42-5-20 ("The [C]omission may, under such rules 
and regulations as it may prescribe, permit two or more employers in businesses of 
a similar nature to enter into agreements to pool their liabilities under the Workers'
Compensation Law for the purpose of qualifying as self-insurers.").  For a self-
insurance fund to be approved, an officer of the proposed organization must submit 
to the Commission various documents, financial statements, and notably, "[a]n
indemnity agreement which jointly and severally binds each member of the fund, 
signed by each proposed member."  S.C. Code Ann. Regs. 67-1501(E)(1)–(8) 
(2012).1  A self-insured fund must be approved by the Commission before it may 
begin operation. Id. § 67-1502 (2012).     
The Agreement identified its purpose as: 
meeting and fulfilling an employer's obligations and liabilities under 
the South Carolina Workers' Compensation Act; to form an overall 
self-insurers fund pursuant to Laws of the State of South Carolina, 
which provides for workers' compensation coverage and benefits; to 
provide, as appropriate, allowable advance discounts on premium
payments made by employers for workers' compensation coverage; 
and to minimize the cost of providing workers' compensation  
1 This requirement of joint and several liability for fund membership is not unique 
to South Carolina.  See infra note 8. 
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coverage by developing and refining specialized claim services and a 
loss prevention program within the South Carolina Home Building 
Industry. 
 
(emphasis added).   
 
In addition to establishing the authority of Board members and extensive 
guidelines for the administration of the Fund, the Agreement further provided that 
amendments to the Agreement may be made by a majority of the Board, 
"However, this Agreement may not be amended so as to change its purpose as set 
forth [above] or to permit the diversion or application of any of the funds of the 
[Fund] for any purpose other than those specified herein." (emphasis added). The 
Agreement also provided that "In the event of termination, the remaining funds 
available in the [Fund], after providing for all outstanding obligations, shall be 
distributed, through a formula determined by the [Board], to the participating 
members."   
 
In the fall of 2003, the Board began discussing the idea of winding down the Fund 
and using the remaining monies on hand to capitalize a mutual insurance company, 
presumably to be comprised of the members of the Fund.  Over the next several 
years, the Board continued to explore this "conversion" with the Association, the 
Commission, and the Department of Insurance (DOI); the two biggest challenges 
were identified as accumulating the $5 million necessary for the mutual insurance 
company's starting capital reserve and upgrading the Fund's existing computer 
systems to enable compliance with DOI's regulatory requirements.   
 
In furtherance of the plan to create a mutual insurance company, the Board 
authorized expenditures from the Fund to purchase a custom computer software 
program; purchase office space costing $1.6 million; include "operations of the 
insurance company" in the scope of its directors and officers insurance coverage; 
and to subscribe to a national workers' compensation insurance-rating and data-
collection bureau. 
 
In May 2011, the Board notified the Commission it planned to cease accepting new 
members into the Fund effective July 1, 2011, and planned to withdraw the Fund 
from the self-insured program effective January 1, 2012.  The Board also sought 












capitalize the reserve fund for the mutual insurance company; however, this 
"approval" included no evaluation of whether this use of Fund monies complied 
with the terms of the Agreement.  Indeed, the director of the self-insurance division 
of the Commission wrote to the Fund's administrator:  
In response to your request[,] we have approved the release of $5 
million in non-pledged assets of the SC Home Builders Self-Insurers 
Fund to be used solely to capitalize the SC Builders Insurance Group, 
Inc., in conjunction with the closure of the self-insured [F]und.  It is 
understood that the [F]und will cease accepting new members 
effective July 1, 2011[,] and will become no longer self-insured for 
workers' compensation in South Carolina effective January 1, 2012.  
The outstanding liabilities of the [F]und at the time of closure, 
January 1, 2012, will remain the responsibility of the self-insured 
[F]und and its membership under joint and several liability. The 
[F]und is required to provide a final audited financial statement 
following closure and will continue to provide the Commission[']s 
Form 11, Fund Quarterly Financial Report, until further notice.  The 
[F]und will also be required to comply with Self-Insurance Tax and 
Second Injury Fund Assessment requirements following the [F]und[']s
closure. 
(emphasis added). 
Petitioners are members of the Fund who, in February 2012, filed suit against the 
Fund, the Board, and the individual members of the Board (collectively 
"Respondents"). Petitioners alleged breach of fiduciary duty; breach of trust; 
breach of contract; and breach of contract accompanied by a fraudulent act.  
Petitioners alleged that the Board committed ultra vires acts in breach of its 
fiduciary duties by removing more than $5 million from the Fund to establish the 
mutual insurance company—monies which should have been returned to the 
Fund's members under the terms of the Agreement.  Petitioners also alleged that in 
addition to not receiving their share of the $5 million paid-in surplus, they have 
suffered or will individually suffer additional tax consequences and additional 
liability exposure to cover the Fund's obligations.  Petitioners alleged that all 
improper expenditures should be reimbursed to the Fund to reduce the amounts for 














Additionally, Petitioners sought an accounting and a declaration that Fund assets 
could not be used for the purpose of establishing a mutual insurance company.   
Respondents moved to dismiss the complaint, asserting eight separate bases for 
dismissal, including (1) the circuit court's lack of subject matter jurisdiction 
because the complaint involved the internal affairs of a trust, which fell within the 
exclusive jurisdiction of the probate court;2 and (2) that the action was derivative in 
nature and did not meet the pleading requirements of Rule 23(b)(1), SCRCP.3  The 
Respondents' motions sought protection from responding to Petitioners' discovery 
requests during the pendency of the motions; incorporated by reference an affidavit 
of the Fund's administrator, to which twelve separate exhibits were attached; and 
stated "the Court will be asked, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), SCRCP, to consider 
matters outside of the Complaint and treat the motion as one for summary 
judgment."   
On September 4, 2012, a hearing was held on Respondents' motions to dismiss, 
during which the circuit court indicated it was inclined to dismiss the complaint 
based on the probate court's exclusive jurisdiction of the internal affairs of trusts 
and requested proposed orders. On January 30, 2013, after the hearing but before 
2 See S.C. Code Ann. § 62-7-201(a) (Supp. 2017) (providing "the probate court has 
exclusive jurisdiction of proceedings initiated by interested parties concerning the 
internal affairs of trusts"). 
3 Rule 23(b)(1) provides: 
In a derivative action brought by one or more shareholders or 
members to enforce a right of a corporation or of an unincorporated 
association, the corporation or association having failed to enforce a 
right which may properly be asserted by it, the complaint shall be 
verified and shall allege that the plaintiff was a shareholder or 
member at the time of the transaction of which he complains . . . .  
The complaint shall also allege with particularity the efforts, if any, 
made by the plaintiff to obtain the action he desires from the directors 
or comparable authority and . . . the reasons for his failure to obtain 
the action or for not making the effort. 
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the circuit court issued its written order, Petitioners sent a written demand letter to 
Respondents' counsel itemizing specific requests: 
 
In particular, our clients believe the following actions are necessary 
and should be taken on behalf of the [F]und: 
 
1. The $5,000,000 which was taken out of the [F]und as excess 
funds to establish a competing mutual fund should be distributed 
immediately to the beneficiaries of the Trust as it is not needed 
for the operation of the South Carolina Builders Self Insurers 
Fund. 
 
2. An accounting should be made of all remaining funds in custody 
of the South Carolina Home Builders Self Insurers Fund.  All 
funds not necessary to insure liability should be distributed to 
members of the Trust. 
 
3. Elections have not been held as required by the Trust documents. 
Elections should be held for all positions of the Trustees. 
 
4. The Trust should be dissolved as it appears in the Trustees' 
decision that a competing entity should be set up and that the 
Trust no longer serves its functions.  As a result, the Trust should 
be dissolved with requisite amounts kept on hand to insure 
against future liabilities with the remaining assets distributed to 
members of the Trust. 
 
5. All assets contemplated for use by the Mutual Fund and 
purchased with that intent should be sold with the proceeds to be 
distributed to beneficiaries of the Trust. 
 
The letter also stated: 
 
[We] believe previous correspondence in the lawsuit set forth the 
basis for these requests of the Trust.  We are just sending this to you 
to make clear to you that under Rule 23 of the South Carolina Rules of 


















                                        
  
 
believe these requests have already been made to you as well as your 
clients. It is our understanding that your clients have refused to take 
these actions. 
If your clients' position is any different, please let [us] know so we can 
discuss this matter.  If [we] do not hear from you regarding this, [we] 
will assume your clients refuse to take the actions as requested above, 
and we will take appropriate action.
Respondents did not immediately respond.   
On March 5, 2013, the circuit court issued a written order of dismissal finding "[i]t 
is clear from the documents submitted to the Court that this dispute concerns a 
trust" and concluding the circuit court therefore lacked subject matter jurisdiction.
Nevertheless, the dismissal was without prejudice, allowing Plaintiffs to refile their 
complaint in Probate Court and subsequently remove the re-filed matter back to 
circuit court.4 
Still having received no response to their January 30, 2013 letter, Petitioners 
refiled their lawsuit in probate court on April 9, 2013, alleging the same causes of 
action and including a new paragraph, which stated:
8. To the extent required by South Carolina Rule of Civil Procedure 
23, the Plaintiffs allege: 
4 See S.C. Code Ann. § 62-1-302(d)(4) ("Notwithstanding the exclusive 
jurisdiction of the probate court over the foregoing matters, any action or 
proceeding filed in the probate court and relating to the following subject matters, 
on motion of a party, or by the court on its own motion, made not later than ten 
days following the date on which all responsive pleadings must be filed, must be 
removed to the circuit court and in these cases the circuit court shall proceed upon 
the matter de novo: . . . (4) matters involving the internal or external affairs of 





a. The Plaintiffs were beneficiaries of the trust at all times relevant 
including when the transactions complained of were made. 
 
b. The Plaintiffs, their agents or others on their behalf have made 
efforts to obtain the action they desire in this matter including 
correspondence to counsel for the Defendants, meetings with 
counsel for the Defendants, correspondence to the Trust and a 
previous lawsuit to no avail. 
 
The re-filed suit was removed to circuit court.   
 
Respondents moved to dismiss this second complaint, alleging, among other 
things, that the lawsuit did not involve a trust but rather was a shareholder 
derivative action and that the complaint failed to comply with the pleading 
requirements of Rule 23(b)(1) and therefore should be dismissed; Respondents 
submitted an affidavit in support of their motion.5    
 
Ultimately, the circuit court dismissed Petitioners' complaint, finding the Fund was 
an unincorporated association, not a trust, and that the complaint was therefore 
subject to Rule 23(b)(1). The circuit court held that the complaint failed to comply 
with Rule 23(b)(1). Petitioners then filed a Rule 59(e) motion arguing the pre-suit 
demand was properly made and that the trial court's order elevated form over 
substance. In their motion, Petitioners also sought to supplement or amend their 
pleadings if more detailed pleadings were required.  The circuit court denied this 
motion. 
 
On appeal, the court of appeals affirmed, finding the circuit court properly 
concluded (1) the Fund was an unincorporated association and not a trust; (2) 
Petitioners' claims were derivative in nature; and (3) that Petitioners' complaint 
 
                                        
 
5 Respondents also alleged Petitioners lacked standing; that the contract claims fail 
because Petitioners were not parties to the Agreement; and that the complaint 
failed to meet the heightened pleading standard of Rule 9(b), SCRCP, as to the 














was properly dismissed as it did not properly allege a pre-suit demand as required 
by Rule 23(b)(1). Patterson v. Witter, 418 S.C. 66, 791 S.E.2d 294 (Ct. App. 
2016). This Court issued a writ of certiorari to review the court of appeals'
decision. 
II.
"In reviewing the dismissal of an action pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), SCRCP, the 
appellate court applies the same standard of review as the trial court."  Doe v. 
Marion, 373 S.C. 390, 395, 645 S.E.2d 245, 247 (2007) (citation omitted).  "In 
considering a motion to dismiss a complaint based on a failure to state facts 
sufficient to constitute a cause of action, the trial court must base its ruling solely 
on allegations set forth in the complaint."  Id. (citation omitted).  "The question is 
whether, in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and with every doubt resolved 
in his behalf, the complaint states any valid claim for relief."  Id. at 395, 645 
S.E.2d at 247–48 (quoting Gentry v. Yonce, 337 S.C. 1, 5, 522 S.E.2d 137, 139 
(1999)). "The complaint should not be dismissed merely because the court doubts 
the plaintiff will prevail in the action." Id. at 395, 645 S.E.2d at 248 (citation 
omitted).  
In considering a motion for dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6), if "matters outside the 
pleading are presented to and not excluded by the Court, the motion shall be 
treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule 56."  
Rule 12(b), SCRCP; see also, e.g., Brown v. James, 389 S.C. 41, 47 n.5, 697 
S.E.2d 604, 607 n.5 (Ct. App. 2010) (citations omitted) (finding that the trial 
court's consideration of matters beyond the pleadings converted the motion to 
dismiss into a motion for summary judgment).  Because the parties submitted 
matters outside the pleadings that were not excluded by the court and certain 
factual findings in the circuit court's order exceeded the scope of the facts alleged 
in the complaint, we find this motion to dismiss was converted into a motion for 
summary judgment and we review it as such. 
"[I]f the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, 
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any 
material fact[, then] the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law."  
Rule 56(c), SCRCP. "In determining whether any triable issue of fact exists, the 












viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party."  Pye v. Estate of Fox, 
369 S.C. 555, 563, 633 S.E.2d 505, 509 (2006) (citations omitted).  "Summary 
judgment is not appropriate where further inquiry into the facts of the case is 
desirable to clarify the application of the law."  USAA Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. 
Clegg, 377 S.C. 643, 653, 661 S.E.2d 791, 796 (2008) (quoting Middleborough 
Horizontal Prop. Regime Council of Co–Owners v. Montedison S.p.A., 320 S.C. 
470, 479, 465 S.E.2d 765, 771 (Ct. App. 1995)).   
A. Unincorporated Association or Trust 
The court of appeals found that although the Agreement, by its terms, purported to 
create a trust, the Fund possessed many characteristics typically associated with 
business corporations, and thus, the Fund was properly considered an 
unincorporated association for the purposes of the pre-suit demand and pleading 
requirements of Rule 23. Petitioners argue the court of appeals erred in 
categorizing the Fund as anything other than precisely what it purports to be—a 
trust—and therefore, Petitioners argue the pre-suit demand and pleading 
requirements of Rule 23(b)(1) are inapplicable. Petitioners alternatively assert that 
in any event they satisfied the pleading requirements of Rule 23(b)(1).  On this 
latter point, we agree with Petitioners.  Nevertheless, we address the dispute over 
the proper characterization of the Agreement and its impact on the applicability of 
Rule 23(b)(1).
In construing a trust agreement, "a court must resort first to the language of the 
instrument, and if the language is perfectly plain and capable of legal construction, 
the language determines the form and effect of the instrument." Germann v. N.Y. 
Life Ins. Co., 286 S.C. 34, 38, 331 S.E.2d 385, 388 (Ct. App. 1985) (citing Chiles 
v. Chiles, 270 S.C. 379, 242 S.E.2d 426 (1978)).  "If the intention of the settlor 
appears on the face of the agreement, then the court will effectuate it, unless it is in 
conflict with principles of law." Id. (citing Citizens & S. Nat'l Bank of S.C. v. 
Auman, 259 S.C. 263, 191 S.E.2d 511 (1972)).
Despite this black-letter law, we acknowledge the truth in the court of appeals' 
observation that the Fund is, in many ways, dissimilar to a garden-variety trust.  
Patterson, 418 S.C. at 78–80, 791 S.E.2d at 301–02.  Nevertheless, that 
dissimilarity is not dispositive.  See Navarro Sav. Ass'n v. Lee, 446 U.S. 458, 462– 













unincorporated association simply because it resembled a business association in 
several aspects, finding instead that the entity was an express trust, just as it 
purported to be, and that there was no basis for disregarding the trust's legal form).  
But many states permit (indeed, one state even requires6) workers' compensation 
self-insured funds to be organized as trusts.7  Also, it is common in many other 
6 See 77 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 1036.2(b)(8) (allowing a group of employers to create a 
workers' compensation self-insured fund if the group "[e]xecutes a trust agreement
under which each member agrees to jointly and severally assume and discharge the 
liabilities arising under this act"). 
7 See, e.g., Ala. Admin. Code r. 480-5-3-.08(9) (2018) ("Each Fund shall have a set 
of Bylaws or shall enter into a trust agreement which shall govern the operation of 
the Fund."); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 23-961.01(A) (2018) ("Two or more 
employers, each of whom are engaged in similar industries, may enter into 
contracts to establish a workers' compensation pool to provide for the payment and 
administration of workers' compensation claims . . . [b]y the execution of a trust 
agreement . . . ."); 099-00-1 Ark. Code R. § 099.05(III)(A) (requiring a workers 
compensation self-insured group "to be administered under the direction of an 
elected board of trustees"); Ill. Admin. Code tit. 50, § 575.110 (2018) (defining the
governing body of a workers' compensation self-insured fund as "any member of 
the pool's Board of Trustees, if the pool is a trust, or any member of the pool's
Board of Directors, if the pool is any other type of entity"); 211 Mass. Code Regs. 
67.06(2)(b)(2) (2018) (requiring self-insured group applicants to submit " a copy of 
the articles of association, trust agreement, or articles of organization"); Mich. 
Admin. Code r. 408.43d (2018) (requiring workers' compensation self-insured 
funds "to be administered under the direction of an elected board of trustees and to 
provide workers' compensation coverage for a group of private employers in the 
same industry or for public employers of the same type of unit"); Mo. Code Regs. 
Ann. tit. 8, § 50-3.010(1)(A)(13) (2018) (defining a workers compensation self-
insured trust as "[a] combination of persons, businesses, firms, or corporations 
bound together to secure, jointly and severally, workers' compensation liability by 
holding the individual interests of each subservient to a common authority for the 
common interests of all. This shall also include the written instrument that creates 
the trust."); Tenn. Comp. R. & Regs. 0780-01-54-.04(2)(a)(1) (2018) (requiring 















states for fund participants to be subject to joint and several liability.8  The
incorporation, trust agreement, or any other similar document from which the pool 
is formed"). 
8 See Ala. Admin. Code r. 480-5-3-.08(6) (2018) ("All participants shall sign 
Participation Agreements providing for joint and several liability for claims against 
the Fund during the coverage periods of their participation."); 099-00-1 Ark. Code 
R. § 099.05(III)(A)(1)(a) (2018) (requiring all fund participants to execute "[a]n
indemnity agreement jointly and severally binding the group and each member 
thereof to comply with the provisions of the Arkansas Workers' Compensation 
laws and Rules and Regulations of the Commission"); Cal. Code Regs. tit. 8, § 
15479(a)–(b)(1) (2018) (requiring each member of a group self-insurer to execute 
an "agreement under which each member of a group self-insurer agrees to assume 
and discharge, jointly and severally, any compensation liability under Labor Code 
Section 3700-3705 of any and all other employers that are parties to the group self-
insurer indemnity agreement"); 3 Colo. Code Regs. § 702-2:2-2-2(7) (2018) 
(requiring pool agreements to "jointly and severally bind each member to pay 
claims and comply with all provisions of the workers' compensation laws of the 
State of Colorado"); Fla. Admin. Code Ann. r. 69O-190.068(1) (2018) ("Each self-
insurers fund member shall enter into an indemnity agreement jointly and severally 
binding the self-insurers fund and each member thereof to comply with the 
provisions of the Florida Workers' Compensation Law"); Ga. Code Ann. § 34-9-
151(9) (2018) (requiring workers' compensation self-insured fund agreements to 
include a provision "through which each member agrees to assume and discharge, 
jointly and severally, any and all liability under this article relating to or arising out 
of the operations of the fund"); 37 La. Admin. Code tit. 37, § 1111(A) (2018) 
("Each self-insurance fund member shall enter into an indemnity agreement jointly 
and severally binding the self-insurance fund and each member thereof to comply 
with the provisions of the applicable Louisiana Revised Statutes and rules, 
regulations, and directives of the Department of Insurance."); 02-031-250 Me. 
Code R. § III(B)(2)(d) (2018) (requiring members of workers' compensation group 
self-insured plans to submit an executed indemnity agreement); Md. Code Regs. 
31.08.09.08(C)(13) (2018) (requiring a workers compensation self-insured fund to
submit "[c]opies of executed agreements with each member assuming joint and 
several liability for obligations of the group in the event of insolvency of the Self-




                                        
 
 
(requiring that all members of a workers' compensation self-insured group are 
jointly and severally liable for all workers' compensation obligations); Mich. 
Admin. Code r. 408.43g(5)(j) (2018) (requiring workers' compensation group self-
insured fund records to include "Individual membership applications containing 
signed indemnity agreements"); Minn. r. 2780.2800(3) (2018) (providing a 
workers' compensation self-insured group "shall not accept any liability for a new 
member until a signed indemnity agreement in the form set forth in part 2780.9920 
has been completed by that new member and filed with the commissioner"); Code 
Miss. R. 20-2-1:1.7(B)(2)(b)(9) (conditioning approval of a workers compensation 
self-insured fund upon the workers compensation commission's receipt of "[a]n
indemnity agreement jointly and severally binding the group self-insurer and each 
member thereof to meet the workers' compensation obligations of each member"); 
Mo. Code Regs. Ann. tit. 8, § 50-3.010(5)(A)(1) (2018) (requiring that workers' 
compensation self-insured trusts include in the trust agreement "an indemnity 
clause which jointly and severally binds the group and each member thereof for 
payment of benefits to employees of members of the group and all other liability 
pursuant to Chapter 287, RSMo"); Mont. Admin. R. 24.29.621(1)(c)(i) (2018) 
(requiring members of a workers compensation self-insured group to execute an 
"agreement to accept joint and several liability for all workers' compensation 
benefits and occupational disease obligations incurred by the employer group"); 
N.J. Admin. Code § 11:15-1.3(b)(5) (2018) (requiring workers' compensation self-
insured groups to obtain "[a]n indemnity and trust agreement, in a form satisfactory 
to the Commissioner, jointly and severally binding the group and each member 
thereof to meet the workers' compensation obligations of each member, and 
establishing a trust for the benefit of persons qualifying to receive workers' 
compensation awards or payments from employers participating in the group"); 
N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit. 12, § 317.9(b)(7) (2018) (allowing a group self-
insurer "to immediately levy an assessment upon the group members or take such 
other action as may be appropriate in order to make up the deficiency"); Okla. 
Admin. Code 810:25-11-15(a)(1) (2018) (requiring "[e]very member of a group 
self-insurance association shall execute an indemnity agreement . . . under which 
each member agrees to assume and discharge, jointly and severally, liability under 
the AWCA of any and all employers party to such agreement"); Or. Admin. R. 
436-050-0270(1)(g) (2018) (requiring employers applying for certification as a 
self-insured employer group to submit a "'Group Self-Insured Indemnity 










presence of joint and several liability among Fund members does not necessarily 
undermine a trust's identity as such; rather it is a function of the overriding policy 
concern of ensuring injured workers' claims are paid.    
The Agreement resembles a trust in some respects, and it does not resemble a trust 
in other respects. However, the question of whether the Fund is a trust need not be 
resolved, for we elect to follow the precedent from other jurisdictions applying 
Rule 23(b)(1) to all actions which are derivative in nature, even if the entity in 
binds each member for the payment of any compensation and moneys due to the 
director by the group or any member of the group"); 34 Pa. Code § 
125.133(c)(8)(i) (2018) (requiring workers' compensation group self-insured 
applicants to submit to the workers compensation bureau the group's "proposed 
trust agreement and bylaws, which shall include: (i) A pledge that each member 
will be jointly and severally liable for the expenses and other obligations of the 
fund and for each other member's workers' compensation liability which is 
incurred while it is a member, including liability for assessments on claims
incurred during a member's membership but not issued until after it has terminated 
membership"); Tenn. Comp. R. & Regs. 0780-01-54-.04(2)(e)(2) (2018) (requiring 
workers' compensation self-insured pool applicants to submit for approval 
"[i]ndemnity agreements between the pool and each member establishing each 
member's joint and several liability to the pool for all expenses, liabilities, and 
claims asserted against the pool by any person or entity"); Tex. Lab. Code Ann. § 
407A.056(a) (requiring applicants for a certificate of approval to operate a workers'
compensation self-insured fund to submit an indemnity agreement that "jointly and 
severally bind[s] the group and each employer who is a member of the group to 
meet the workers' compensation obligations of each member"); 14 Va. Admin. 
Code § 5-370-40(A)(1) (2018) (providing "[a]n application submitted by a group 
self-insurance association shall be accompanied by the following items . . . 1. A 
copy of the members' indemnity agreement and power of attorney required by 14 
VAC 5-370-120 binding the association and each member of the association, 
jointly and severally, to comply with the provisions of the Act and copies of any 
other governing instruments of the proposed group self-insurance association"); 
Wash. Admin. Code § 296-15-024(3)(a)(v) (2018) (requiring members of a 
workers' compensation group self-insurance fund to submit "[a]n indemnity 
agreement jointly and severally binding the group and each member to comply 











question is a trust. See, e.g., Accredited Aides Plus, Inc. v. Program Risk Mgmt., 
Inc., 46 N.Y.S.3d 246, 255 (App. Div. 2017) (finding the "analysis applicable to 
derivative actions against corporations has been held to apply to trusts" and finding 
that the joint and several liability of workers' compensation group self-insured trust 
members "does not require us to set aside the legal distinction [] between 
derivative and direct claims"); see also In re Mortg. & Realty Tr. Sec. Litig., 787 F. 
Supp. 84, 86 (E.D. Pa. 1991) (applying the Rule 23 demand requirement to a 
derivative action against the board of trustees of a real estate investment trust).  
The key inquiry is whether the underlying challenge is properly characterized as 
derivative in nature. Accordingly, the applicability of the pre-suit demand and 
pleading requirements of Rule 23(b)(1) are to be determined not on the basis of 
whether the entity involved is or is not a trust, but rather, whether the claims at 
issue are direct or derivative.  We turn now to that issue. 
B. Direct or Derivative 
Petitioners argue that the court of appeals erred in finding all of their claims were 
derivative in nature. Specifically, Petitioners allege that based on the joint and 
several liability the Act imposes upon members of the Fund, "the injury is to each 
beneficiary who must, individually, make up for any shortfall in trust assets."  
Based on this individual liability exposure, Petitioners argue their actions are direct 
rather than derivative. We agree in part and disagree in part, and we find 
Petitioners' complaint includes both direct and derivative claims. 
"An action seeking to remedy a loss to the corporation is generally a derivative 
one." Brown v. Stewart, 348 S.C. 33, 49, 557 S.E.2d 676, 684 (Ct. App. 2001) 
(citation omitted).  An action regarding the fiduciary obligation of a director is 
ordinarily enforceable through a derivative action.  Id. (citation omitted).  "A 
shareholder may maintain an individual action only if his loss is separate and 
distinct from that of the corporation."  Id. (citation omitted). 
"If misconduct by the management of a corporation has caused a particular loss to 
an individual stockholder, the liability for the mismanagement is an asset of the 
individual stockholder."  Id. (quoting Ward v. Griffin, 295 S.C. 219, 221, 367 
S.E.2d 703, 703–04 (Ct. App. 1988)).  "Of course, a suit based on the misconduct 
can be brought by the individual stockholder."  Id. at 49, 557 S.E2d at 684–85 



















therefore, to inquire whether the acts of mismanagement charged to the directors 
affected the plaintiffs directly, or as their interests were submerged in the 
corporation whose assets were thus dissipated."  Id. at 49, 557 S.E.2d at 685 
(quoting Stewart v. Ficken, 151 S.C. 424, 427, 149 S.E. 164, 165 (1929)).
"Specifically, to distinguish a derivative claim from a direct one, the court 
considers: (1) who suffered the alleged harm, the corporation or the suing 
stockholders, individually, and (2) who would receive the benefit of any recovery 
or other remedy, the corporation or the stockholders individually."  19 Am. Jur. 2d 
Corporations § 1923. Direct and derivative claims may be brought 
simultaneously.  19 Am. Jur. 2d Corporations § 1922. "When determining 
whether a claim is derivative or direct, some injuries affect both the corporation 
and the stockholders; if this dual aspect is present, a plaintiff can choose to sue 
individually."  Id. (citing Carsanaro v. Bloodhound Techs., Inc., 65 A.3d 618 (Del. 
Ch. 2013)); see also Horizon House-Microwave, Inc. v. Bazzy, 486 N.E.2d 70, 74 
(Mass. App. Ct. 1985) (observing a shareholder may pursue both direct and 
derivative claims in a single action).  
In evaluating Petitioners' claims in the underlying complaint, the court of appeals 
found:
In the instant case, [Petitioners] allege the Board's decision to remove 
$5 million from the Fund harmed the Fund's ability to adequately 
cover its risks. Thus, the action is premised on the alleged harm to the 
overall Fund, not to individual members.  Accordingly, we find the 
circuit court correctly held [Petitioners'] claims were derivative and 
subject to the pleading requirements of Rule 23(b)(1).
Patterson, 418 S.C. at 81, 791 S.E.2d at 302 (citations omitted).   
While we agree with the court of appeals that Petitioners' claim that the removal of 
the $5 million impacted the Fund's ability to cover its risk is derivative in nature, 
this claim is by no means the only claim asserted in the complaint.  Indeed, the 
court of appeals overlooked various other causes of action and forms of relief 




















Though discovery has not been conducted, one or more of Petitioners' additional 
claims may be direct in nature.  We thus find the court of appeals erred in
concluding that the complaint alleged only derivative claims.  See Accredited Aides 
Plus, 46 N.Y.S.3d at 255 (finding certain claims by members of a workers'
compensation group self-insured trust were direct, not derivative, in nature and 
observing that "just as the trust's deficits are eventually passed through to employer 
members as assessments by the Board, any recovery by the Board upon its claims
on behalf of the trust will benefit the employer members by reducing the trust's 
deficit and the employer members' corresponding liabilities"). To the extent the 
court of appeals affirmed the dismissal of Petitioners' direct claims based on Rule 
23, this was error. 
Although we believe Petitioners' complaint may involve some direct claims, we 
nevertheless believe the court of appeals correctly found that certain claims were 
derivative in nature. Accordingly we turn now to what we view as the critical 
question before the Court—whether Petitioners' complaint met the pleading 
requirements of Rule 23 (b)(1).     
C. Compliance with Rule 23(b)(1) 
Lastly, Petitioners argue that even assuming Rule 23(b)(1) applies to their claims, 
the court of appeals erred in finding the requirements of that rule were not 
satisfied. We agree, for even if all claims are derivative and Rule 23(b)(1) applies, 
the demand and pleading requirements of Rule 23(b)(1) have been met. 
Both the trial court and the court of appeals found evaluation of whether 
Petitioners' complaint complied with Rule 23(b)(1) was governed by the court of 
appeals decision in Carolina First Corp. v. Whittle, 343 S.C. 176, 539 S.E.2d 402 
(Ct. App. 2000). In Whittle, three shareholders of Carolina First Corporation 
brought a derivative action seeking to recover disproportionate stock bonuses paid 
to three executives.  Id. at 180, 539 S.E.2d at 405. The complaint included general 
allegations that the plaintiffs made pre-suit demands upon the Board of Directors; 
however, the complaint stated "merely that the plaintiffs demanded 'certain 
information' and 'certain actions.'"  Id. at 189, 539 S.E.2d at 409.  The court of 
appeals concluded these allegations were not sufficiently particularized to satisfy 
















identify the alleged wrongdoers, describe the factual basis of the wrongful acts and 
the harm caused to the corporation, and request remedial relief."  Id. (citation 
omitted).  The court of appeals noted that although the plaintiffs submitted copies 
of letters purporting to meet the pre-suit demand requirement, the letters could not 
be considered because they were not attached to the complaint; and in any event, 
the letters did not satisfy the pleading requirements of Rule 23(b)(1).  Therefore, 
the court of appeals concluded the trial court did not err in refusing to consider 
them.  Id. at 190, 539 S.E.2d at 410.
The facts of this case are distinguishable from those in Whittle. Here, although the 
January 30, 2013 pre-suit demand letter was not expressly incorporated by 
reference into the complaint, unlike in Whittle, the January 30, 2013 letter does
constitute an adequate demand in this case.  Another issue here is Petitioners'
failure to include the magic phrase "which is incorporated herein by reference" in 
their discussion of the letter in paragraph 8 of their complaint.  Indeed, the 
allegations concerning the pre-suit demand in Petitioners' complaint are 
appreciably more detailed than those in Whittle. And certainly, when the January 
30, 2013 letter is considered in conjunction with the complaint, there is ample 
evidence that Rule 23 is satisfied.  The trial court simply found it was precluded 
from looking at the January 30, 2013 letter, which was error.  
Moreover, in light of the parties' submission and the trial court's willingness to 
consider multiple affidavits and documents outside the four corners of the 
complaint, we reject an approach that approves of a trial court's consideration of 
everything except the pre-suit demand letter that was actually sent and received.  
See L-7 Designs, Inc. v. Old Navy, LLC, 647 F.3d 419, 422 (2d Cir. 2011) 
(explaining a complaint may be "deemed to include any written instrument 
attached to it as an exhibit, materials incorporated in it by reference, and 
documents that, although not incorporated by reference, are 'integral' to the 
complaint" (quoting Sira v. Morton, 380 F.3d 57, 67 (2d Cir. 2004))); Chambers v. 
Time Warner, Inc., 282 F.3d 147, 155 (2d Cir. 2002) (explaining that "when a 
district court considers certain extra-pleading materials and excludes others, it risks 
depriving the parties of a fair adjudication of the claims by examining an 
incomplete record").  Accordingly, we reverse the dismissal of Petitioners'








For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the decision of the court of appeals and 
remand this case for further proceedings.  
 
 
REVERSED AND REMANDED. 
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WILLIAMS, J.:  In this domestic relations matter, James Weatherford (Father) 
appeals the family court's order awarding maternal grandparents Evelyn Grantham 
(Grandmother) and David Grantham (collectively, Grandparents) limited visitation 















                                        
applying section 63-3-530(A)(33) of the South Carolina Code (Supp. 2011) by 
requiring a fit parent to proceed with grandparent visitation.  We affirm.1 
FACTS/PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Kasey Weatherford (Mother) married Father on August 25, 2001.  Mother and 
Father had two minor children during the marriage.  Shortly after the second child's
birth, Mother began to suffer from severe depression and substance abuse, and 
required frequent help caring for the children.  Because Father often worked long 
shifts and traveled out of town, Grandparents, Father's parents, and Father's aunts 
helped Mother take care of the children.  Grandparents were involved in the 
children's lives since birth, often taking care of the children multiple times each 
week. Grandparents maintained a relationship with the children much like parents: 
taking and picking up the children from school, cooking for the children, bathing 
the children, buying clothes for the children, and taking the children to doctor's 
appointments.  The children had a positive relationship with Grandparents' adopted 
children, who were very close in age.
In February 2013, Mother and Father separated.  In June 2013, Mother and Father 
signed a custody agreement, granting custody of the children to Father and 
reasonable visitation to Mother.  The parties agreed Mother's visitation would 
occur at Grandparents' house under Grandmother's supervision.  That same month, 
Father became romantically involved with Rebecca, who quickly became another 
caretaker for the children.  Mother's supervised visitation continued until 
November 9, 2013, when Mother tragically committed suicide.  At Mother's 
funeral, the minister—whom Grandparents selected to deliver the eulogy—made 
harsh statements referencing Mother's "abusive marriage" and implying Father 
bore responsibility for Mother's death. Grandparents apologized to Father and 
Rebecca after the funeral and denied giving the minister the information behind the 
statements. However, the parties' relationship quickly began to deteriorate.
After the funeral, Father immediately limited how often Grandparents saw the 
children. The parties' relationship worsened after a public altercation between 
Grandparents and Rebecca in front of the children, an argument between 
Grandparents and Father in which Grandparents blamed Father for Mother's death, 
















                                        
 
 
and another confrontation between Rebecca and Grandparents around Christmas 
2013 when Grandparents expressed their frustration over the small amount of time 
they spent with the children during the holidays.  Due to the parties' strained 
relationship, Grandparents only visited with the children twice since the funeral, 
notwithstanding some incidental contact, before Father stopped Grandparents from
seeing the children altogether.  In January 2014, Grandparents filed this action 
seeking visitation with the children.  The family court appointed a guardian ad 
litem (GAL) and held a final merits hearing.  Subsequently, the family court issued 
an order awarding Grandparents limited visitation.
Relying on Marquez v. Caudill,2 the family court awarded Grandparents one 
weekend of visitation per month from 5:00 P.M. on Thursday until 5:00 P.M. on 
Sunday, one week of summer visitation, and visitation any other time the parties 
agreed. The family court also ordered the parties to attend reunification 
counseling, forbid Grandparents from associating Father with Mother's death, and 
charged the GAL with providing recommendations for implementing the court-
ordered visitation. Father filed a Rule 59(e), SCRCP, motion seeking 
reconsideration, which the family court denied.  This appeal followed.
ISSUE ON APPEAL 
Did the family court err by requiring a fit parent to proceed with grandparent 
visitation due to an unconstitutional application of section 63-3-530(A)(33) of the 
South Carolina Code (Supp. 2011)? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW
"[T]he proper standard of review in family court matters is de novo . . . ."  Stoney 
v. Stoney, 422 S.C. 593, 596, 813 S.E.2d 486, 487 (2018) (per curiam).  Although 
this broad scope of review grants the appellate court the authority to find facts in 
accordance with its own view of the preponderance of the evidence, the appellate 
court is not required to ignore the family court's superior position to make 
2 376 S.C. 229, 249, 656 S.E.2d 737, 747 (2008) (finding "a biological parent[']s 
death and an attempt to maintain ties with the deceased parent[']s family may be 






credibility determinations and to assign comparative weight to witness testimony.  
Lewis v. Lewis, 392 S.C. 381, 384–85, 709 S.E.2d 650, 651–52 (2011).  The 
appellant bears the burden of convincing the appellate court that the preponderance 





Father argues the family court erred in unconstitutionally applying section 63-3-
530(A)(33) of the South Carolina Code (Supp. 2011) by requiring a fit parent to 
proceed with grandparent visitation.  Specifically, Father contends the family court 
erred in not considering the children's best interests, giving too much weight to the 
Grandparents' relationship with the children, and making findings inconsistent with 
the GAL's report. We disagree. 
 
Parents have a fundamental right to make decisions concerning the care, custody, 
and control of their children. See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 66 (2000); 
Camburn v. Smith, 355 S.C. 574, 579, 586 S.E.2d 565, 567 (2003).  When 
considering grandparent visitation over a parent's objection, the family court must 
allow a presumption that a fit parent's decision is in the best interest of the child.  
Camburn, 355 S.C. at 579, 586 S.E.2d at 567 (citing Troxel, 530 U.S. at 68–69).  
Although parents and grandparents are not on equal footing in a visitation contest, 
the family court may still award visitation over a parent's objection if the 
contesting grandparents can meet certain requirements.  Id. at 579–80, 586 S.E.2d 
at 568. Subsection 63-3-530(A)(33) codified these requirements and granted the 
family court the exclusive jurisdiction 
  
to order visitation for the grandparent of a minor child 
whe[n] either or both parents of the minor child is or are 
deceased, or are divorced, or are living separate and apart 
in different habitats, if the court finds that: 
  
(1) the child's parents or guardians are 
unreasonably depriving the grandparent of the 
opportunity to visit with the child, including 
denying visitation of the minor child to the 
42 
 
grandparent for a period exceeding ninety days; 
and 
 
(2) the grandparent maintained a relationship 
similar to a parent-child relationship with the 
minor child; and 
   
(3) that awarding grandparent visitation would not 
interfere with the parent-child relationship; and: 
 
(a) the court finds by clear and convincing 
evidence that the child's parents or guardians 
are unfit;3 or  
   
(b) the court finds by clear and convincing 
evidence that there are compelling 
circumstances to overcome the presumption 
that the parental decision is in the child's 
best interest. 
 
§ 63-3-530(A)(33) (Supp. 2011).4  
 
As to the first requirement, we find Father unreasonably denied Grandparents 
visitation with the minor children for a period exceeding ninety days.  The record 
demonstrates Mother is deceased and Grandparents presented undisputed 
 




3 Grandparents concede that Father is a fit parent. 
4 Despite Father's contention that the subsequent 2014 amendment to subsection 
63-3-530(A)(33) should apply, Grandparents filed their action in January 2014 
when the 2010 amendment was in effect.  Therefore, we apply the 2010 
amendment. See Bergstrom v. Palmetto Health Alliance, 358 S.C. 388, 397, 596 
S.E.2d 42, 46–47 (2004) ("In South Carolina, the law in effect at the time the cause 
of action accrued controls the parties' legal relationships and rights." (quoting 












                                        
 
testimony that Father unreasonably deprived Grandparents of the opportunity to 
visit with the children for a period exceeding ninety days.5 
As to the second requirement, we find that Grandparents had a significant and 
extensive relationship with the children.  The record indicates Grandparents 
maintained a parent-child relationship with the children: taking the children to and 
from school, cooking for the children, bathing the children, buying clothes for the 
children, and taking the children to doctor's appointments.   
As to the third requirement, we find awarding grandparent visitation will not 
interfere with Father's relationship with the children.  Grandmother's testimony 
demonstrates that the children developed a positive relationship with Grandparents 
prior to Mother's death and spent time with Mother at Grandparents' house.  
Grandmother knew the children had a loving relationship with Father, respected 
that relationship, and insisted that visitation would not interfere with Father's 
ability to parent. Therefore, we find granting limited grandparent visitation of one 
weekend per month and one week during the summer will not interfere with 
Father's relationship with the children.  See Marquez, 376 S.C. at 249, 656 S.E.2d 
at 747 (finding an award of two weeks visitation during the summer and one week 
during the Christmas holidays did not interfere with the father's relationship with 
the child); Dodge v. Dodge, 332 S.C. 401, 416, 505 S.E.2d 344, 352 (Ct. App. 
1998) (finding the proposed visitation amount reasonable under the circumstances
and awarding grandparents one weekend of visitation with grandchildren each 
month and two weeks during the summer after the death of grandchildren's 
biological mother). 
Finally, we find compelling circumstances justify granting visitation over Father's
objection.6  Our supreme court specifically addressed the issue of compelling 
5 On appeal, Father does not contest that Grandparents met this statutory 
requirement.
6 Father argues the family court improperly considered Grandparents' best interest, 
rather than the children's best interest, when the family court found, 
"[Grandparents] are fit and proper individuals and there is no evidence that having 
a relationship with the minor children is not in their best interest." (emphasis 
added). Father contends "their" refers to the Grandparents' best interests and not 















                                        
circumstances in Marquez. The acutely similar facts make Marquez dispositive of 
this issue.
In Marquez, a maternal grandmother sought visitation of her daughter's youngest 
child after her daughter's suicide.  376 S.C. at 233–34, 656 S.E.2d at 739.  The 
maternal grandmother only saw her daughter's children intermittently since their 
birth due to her living and working out of state.  Id. at 238–39, 656 S.E.2d at 741– 
42. In Marquez, because the youngest child's stepfather adopted the child, the 
supreme court recognized the stepfather is treated as the child's parent.  Id. at 249 
n.11, 656 S.E.2d at 747 n.11.  Our supreme court affirmed the family court's 
limited visitation award––two weeks during the summer months and one week 
during the Christmas holidays––to the grandmother.  Id. at 249, 656 S.E.2d at 747. 
Addressing its decision in Camburn and applying section 63-3-530, our supreme 
court held, "a biological parent[']s death and an attempt to maintain ties with that 
deceased parent[']s family may be compelling circumstances justifying ordering 
visitation over a fit parent[']s objection."  Id.
Turning to the present case, we find the family court correctly relied on Marquez to 
find compelling circumstances existed to justify ordering visitation over Father's
objection. Father argues the facts of this case are unique and different from 
Marquez. Notwithstanding the similarity in the death of a biological parent, the 
circumstances here provide a stronger basis for finding compelling circumstances
than in Marquez. Unlike the maternal grandmother in Marquez, who only saw her 
grandchildren rarely before moving closer to them just before seeking visitation, 
Grandparents developed deep ties with their grandchildren from birth, and saw the 
children multiple times each week until Mother's funeral.  Grandparents fostered 
this relationship by taking the children to and from school, cooking for the 
children, bathing the children, buying clothes for the children, and taking the 
children to doctor's appointments.  Even after Mother's death, Grandparents 
continued to attempt to visit the children.  Although one witness advocated against 
visitation, other witnesses advocated for Grandparents' visitation, testifying that the 
children loved Grandparents, the children wanted Grandparents involved in their 
lives, and that prohibiting Grandparents' visitation could be harmful to the children.  
order, which referenced the best interest of the minor children, we find "their" 
refers to the minor children, not Grandparents.  Therefore, we find the family court 








See Camburn, 355 S.C. at 579, 596 S.E.2d at 568 (finding significant harm to the 
child constituted compelling circumstances).  Therefore, we find compelling 
circumstances exist to justify granting grandparent visitation over Father's 
objection. 
Because we find Grandparents satisfied section 63-3-530(A)(33)'s requirements, 
the family court's limited visitation award to Grandparents is 
AFFIRMED. 
LOCKEMY, C.J., and KONDUROS, J., concur. 
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